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ABSTRACT 
Africa clearly needs foreign investments for its development. But such investments in extractive 
industries and hydropower projects should not cause ecological degradation and threaten the 
livelihoods of many Africans. Sustainability comprises economic, social and environmental 
dimensions and is thus a broad concept, rather describing a balancing act and a process of 
continuous improvement than an achievable target. The emphasis of this paper is on the 
environmental dimension of sustainability and how it sits with the other dimensions, particularly in 
Chinese investments in African states. The discussion is embedded into the general context of the 
rise of non-triad multinational enterprises and its implications for transnational regulation.  
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CCS discussion papers aim to contribute to the academic debate on China’s global rise and the 
consequences thereof for African development. The CCS therefore explicitly invites scholars 
from Africa, China, or elsewhere, to use this format for advanced papers that are ready for an 
initial publication, not least to obtain input from other colleagues in the field. Discussion 
papers should thus be seen as work in progress, exposed to (and ideally stimulating) policy-
relevant discussion based on academic standards.  
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1. THE EMERGENCE OF NON-TRIAD MULTINATIONALS 
AND THEIR IMPACT ON TRANSNATIONAL NORM-
BUILDING 
During the last years, we have witnessed a surge in multinational enterprises from outside the traditional 
triad (Japan, North America and Western Europe). This development has become one of the most 
interesting topics in the study of North-South relations in the international political economy. In contrast 
to earlier times, foreign direct investment is no longer an activity of triad enterprises alone. More and 
more, companies from the former periphery are expanding, increasingly also by acquiring assets within 
the triad. 
As of 2013, five of the top twenty largest global companies as established within the FT Global 500 are 
based outside the triad, most notably from China (4: PetroChina, 11: ICBC, 14: China Mobile, 19: China 
Construction Bank) and from South-Korea (13: Samsung). Other non-triad multinational enterprises 
(NTMNEs) within the top 200 come from Brazil (Ambev, No. 41), Russia (Gazprom, No. 57), Taiwan 
(Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing, No. 70), Saudi Arabia (Saudi Basic Industries, No. 83), India 
(Tata, No. 134), Mexico (AMX, No. 144) or from Singapore (Singapore Telecom, No. 170). Many of 
these companies have expanded strongly over the last years, also reflected by the fact that there are nine 
NTMNE newcomers on the list, mainly from China, but also from Indonesia, Thailand and Turkey, 
bringing the total number of non-triad companies in the 2013 FT Top 500 to 121.  
As in previous years (Nölke, 2011, 2013), China is the top source of NTMNEs. A sector break-up 
demonstrates that natural resources clearly are among the most typical focus on NTMNEs in China and 
elsewhere as indicated by the leading role of companies such as PetroChina, Petrobras, Sinopec, 
Gazprom, Vale or CNOOC. While NTMNEs originally have become famous for their take-over of 
established Western companies (e.g. Mittal/Arcelor, Lenovo/IBM PC division, Tata/Jaguar), more 
recently their potential impact on environmental conditions in their target economies have come to the 
fore, in particular with regard to investments in Africa. Given the long-standing concerns with regard to 
the regulation of the conduct of multinational corporations, the question arises whether Chinese 
multinationals are any better or worse than companies based in Europe, Japan or the US. In order to 
address this question, the paper will first explain the background to Chinese outward FDI, before turning 
to recent debates about the environmental impacts of Chinese investments in Africa (section 2). The core 
of the paper deals with the regulation of these investments. It then proceeds in two steps. First, the 
general approach of the Chinese state with regard to the environmental conduct of state-owned, as well as 
private companies will be discussed (section 3). Second, the paper deals with the procedures with regard 
to the environmental sustainability of Chinese investments in Africa, including lending policies by 
Chinese financial institutions and environmental impact assessments (section 4).  
The paper concludes by highlighting the specific environmental challenges of Chinese investments in 
Africa. Of particular concern are the very close ties between the Chinese government, Chinese 
multinationals and African states. The expansion of Chinese multinationals, not only state-owned, but 
also the formally private ones, is strongly based on a close cooperation with Chinese state institutions 
(Nölke, 2014). If this type of state capitalism interacts with African state authorities that make private use 
of resources, it is very difficult for civil societies to make sure that the fruits of inward foreign 
investments are widely shared. In this way, Chinese investments in Africa pose a particular limit to forms 
of private transnational governance such as the Equator Principles (Graz and Nölke, 2008). However, 
state capitalism also has its potential advantages for limiting the negative environmental effects of foreign 
direct investments. In line with other recent studies (Compagnon and Alejandro, 2013; Maurin and 
Yeophantong, 2013), we highlight that growing concerns of the Chinese government with regard to the 
(environmental) damage caused by Chinese overseas investments. While the implementation of the 
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relevant Chinese regulations in African economies still is somewhat uneven (to say the least), it still may 
even lead to a more forceful form of guidance of multinational corporations with regard to environmental 
protection than the voluntary frameworks predominant in the established economies. 
2. THE CHANGING NATURE OF CHINESE INVESTMENTS 
From being one of the world’s largest FDI recipients since the late 1970s after its “open door” policy 
which led to entrepreneurial and industrial reforms, China from the late 1990s has become an emerging 
FDI provider particularly in developing countries in Southeast Asia, Latin America and Africa. Political 
and economic reforms undertaken in China have led the country towards a more liberal economy and 
played a key role in China’s overseas political economy. In China’s growing engagement with Africa, 
shifts have been noticed despite rhetorical consistency. China-Africa relations which were mainly based 
on aid-driven relations are now economy-driven with investments and trade underpinning the economic 
cooperation between China and African countries. From 1949 to 1980, only limited number of Chinese 
companies were present in Africa and their activities focused particularly on governments’ development 
projects. From the late 1990s, through its “go out” policy, China has motivated its companies; first State-
Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and later private enterprises to venture abroad also at times driven by 
different reasons, as to be explored in this text. The dimension of sustainability of FDI (still often 
narrowed to economic sustainability in the debate) and linked with that the strife for corporate social 
responsibility is a more recent debate with regard to Chinese FDI in Africa. The debate in China, 
however, has longer roots, not least so in state owned enterprises (and their danwei, the work units) and 
their social responsibilities such as the provision of health care and other services. The environmental 
dimension, however, seems to be more a function of substantial environmental destruction in China 
herself and increasing international pressure with regard to global environmental impact. Consequently, 
environmental issues are increasing in relevance in China’s international relations, not least in its stance on 
climate change (see, for instance, Wei Liang, 2010), but also in debates about standards applied in 
cooperation. The environmental standards are the most recent dimension in discussion.  
Sino-African relations have been at the centre of political and economic debates since the beginning of 
the 2000s fuelled by the establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000 and 
the release of a white paper on China’s Africa policy in 2006. Investments and trade constitute the 
backbone of China-Africa relations. China’s FDI stock in Africa has drastically increased over the past 
years: from US$ 56 million in 1996, it is at US$ 15 billion in 2012. Trade and investment drive more 
curiosity about China’s engagement in Africa and economic, social and environmental impact and 
political responses.  
Besides the vast opportunities for Africa, and much like any other outside assistance and co-operation, 
the Chinese contribution to development comes with challenges that need to be managed and mitigated. 
The challenges evolving from the engagement of Chinese actors, however, will be specific to China and 
have a lot to do with the development paths chosen in the “Middle Kingdom”. Much discussed are the 
governance challenges that China might or might not present to African states and societies (Taylor, 2006; 
Hackenesch, 2011; Hodzi et al., 2012). Environmental challenges are discussed to a lesser extent. They are 
often discussed as linked to the type of Chinese investment in rather environmentally hazardous 
investments in mining or timber logging in Africa (cf. Bosshard,  2008; Conservation International, 2011). 
Yet, environmental challenges are part and parcel of development through industrialisation and will also 
impact on the long-term development prospects of African states. The rapid pace of Chinese investments 
flows in Africa and their expansion to various sectors (resources, infrastructure, services; and so forth.) 
lead us to question the various political and economic actors in China’s presence in Africa, the role of the 
Chinese government in the Chinese multinational companies’ expansion in Africa and the aspects of 
incentives and regulation for environmental sustainability in China and in the business expansion into the 
African market. 
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3. DEBATES ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF 
CHINESE INVESTMENT IN AFRICA 
Since the turn of the century, Africa’s economic growth is supported by Chinese investments in the 
continent. China has gained and changed the political economic strategy in Africa, not least so by 
explicitly not attaching political conditions (no strings policy) to its overseas operations other than the 
fundamental recognition of the One China policy (in other words, the non-recognition of 
Taiwan/Republic of China). China’s political strategy thereby contrasts with the western policies on 
human rights, good governance, environment and sustainable development. Beijing’s policy is centred 
around not interfering in internal affairs of countries where it is operating or investing (Brautigam, 2011). 
Presence of Chinese actors in Africa based on a strict hands-off policy in political and environmental 
standards has raised debates and discussions about the social, environmental and sustainable development 
impacts of Chinese investments in Africa (Bosshard, 2008). While this initially could also be understood 
as reassurance to other powers that a highly interventionist/ideological policy of the type of Maoist 
foreign policy was over, in a post-1990 world, Chinese investors and extractive companies are accused of 
undermining good governance, environmental and sustainable policies in Africa. 
Chinese investments in natural resources are concentrated in remote areas, inaccessible zones and 
sensitive extractive industries. These were the niches for an emerging China to engage without having to 
take on Western competition heads on. Operating in such remote areas and in sensitive sectors and 
industries clearly involves social and environmental risks. China’s growing presence in extractive 
industries aggravating environmental degradation and accelerating the exhaustion of non-renewable 
resources has attracted the world’s attention (Gonzalez, 2011).  Chinese investments in sensitive sectors 
raise the debate on sustainable economic development for Africa. Concerns around China’s 
environmental challenges linked to extractive industries in Africa have been voiced. In the long run, 
African governments that have welcomed Chinese investments (over political, social, environmental 
issues) in ecologically sensitive sectors with weak governance and control systems will endure the 
environmental impacts that extractive industries involve without enjoying the economic benefits expected 
for their growth (Gonzalez, 2011). In this regard, Africa is clearly a different investment environment 
than, say, Australia, where extractive industries play at least equally high an importance.  
In Africa, many examples illustrated the environmental impacts linked to Chinese investments in 
extractive industries. In Gabon, Chinese oil company, SINOPEC, operating in the oil industry in Loango 
National Park has been ordered to stop its exploration project in September 2006. 1  The Gabonese 
ministry of environment did not approve the environmental impact study and oil exploration in the park 
which threatened animals (Bosshard, 2008). In 2010 in Gabon, an environmental NGO (Brainforest) also 
campaigned against a Chinese iron ore development project for hydropower with poor environmental 
guidelines and threatening the Ivindo National park (International Rivers, 2010). In Zambia, officials 
urged to close down Chinese mining company Collum Coal Mine Industries for establishing low standard 
working conditions and failing to implement environmental and safety regulations. Due to these 
complaints about and questions around the environmental impact of Chinese investments in Africa, 
African governments (Sierra Leone, DRC, Zambia) are becoming more assertive in dealing with Chinese 
companies about environmental standards and corporate social responsibility (Mol, 2011). On the 
positive side, according to Mol (2011), a number of Chinese projects in extractive industries (oil, mining, 
copper, coal and so on) in Africa following criticism and complaints on environmental pollution have 
been closed. 
                                                     
1  See, Centre for Chinese Studies: China’s engagement of Africa, Preliminary scoping of African case studies, 
November 2007, pp94.  
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Other than extractive industries, Chinese activities are often in large scale infrastructure projects, 
including energy generation. Energy is in dire need for Africa’s households and in order to unfold any 
industrial potential. Infrastructural shortcomings were identified as major obstacles to further 
development time and again, starting with NEPAD (the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, a 
socio-economic programme of the African Union) in 2001 and emphasised time and again since, 
including during the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Cape Town in 2013. Lack of adequate 
infrastructure has led to an increasing Chinese presence in the energy sector, at times worryingly an 
environmentally sensitive sector in the continent. In the large-scale hydropower sector – particularly 
under scrutiny for environmentally harmful effects – Chinese dam construction companies’ forays into 
Africa in order to expand their markets and improve infrastructure building have raised a number of 
concerns regarding the negative impacts they create in communities where dams are built.  
Many African countries in their hydropower projects to satisfy their population needs for water or 
electricity have failed to attract foreign traditional investors. Western investors are concerned about 
economic viability and about the environmental and social impacts such investments will have on host 
communities and the zones where dams will be built, and thus impose ex ante conditions that have to be 
met before funding is made available. To avoid these conditionalities regarding the dams projects’ 
environmental and social assessments, African countries such as Sudan with the Merowe Dam or Ghana 
with its Bui Dam have turned to China Export and Import Bank with less environmental and social 
conditions than its Western counterparts to finance their projects. Unlike Western financiers in the 
different investment projects in Africa, China’s assistance comes with few strings attached – and with 
social and environmental challenges.  
In 2003, China Export and Import Bank has approved loans worth US$ 519 million to Chinese 
companies for the construction of the Merowe Dam in Sudan. The dam will ultimately displace 50 000 
people from the fertile Nile valley to desert locations and for which the Sudanese government failed to 
attract funders for many years (Bosshard, Brewer and McDonald: 2009).  Because of its strategy of non-
interference in African countries’ domestic affairs, China’s activities have been accused of leading to 
environmental degradation and of lacking respect for the right of people to be displaced where dams are 
constructed (Hensengerth and Scheumann, 2011). In Ghana, the contentious Sinohydro’s Bui Dam 
project will flood part of the Bui National park (Bosshard, 2008). As the Bui Dam project was 
environmentally and socially sensitive, Ghanaian authorities had difficulties to find potential investors 
(Hensengerth and Scheumann, 2011). To meet their political agenda which prioritises the provision of 
energy for development, Ghana’s authorities attributed the project to Sinohydro.  
Supported by finance made available via China Exim bank, Sinohydro is playing a leading role amongst 
dam builders around the world. According to Bloom and Poplak (2011), Sinohydro has 240 projects 
globally, with 100 in Africa, many of them in ecologically endangered areas. Although Sinohydro’s 
contributes to infrastructure building, water access and hydropower generation, the Chinese giant 
company causes environmental and social issues to the host communities where the dams are built, as 
activities in Africa are concentrated in sensitive areas. 
Five of Sinohydro’s dam projects, for instance, are located in Botswana.  As an arid and landlocked 
country, demand for water in Botswana continues to rise at a high rate and the country faces serious 
water shortage. The building of the Dikgatlhong Dam, was thus consequential, but mired with challenges. 
Once completed in late 2011 (according to the project’s forecasts), the dam will supply 400 cubic meters 
particularly in eastern parts of the country (Bloom and Poplak, 2011). The construction of the dam at the 
confluence of Shashe and Tati rivers will certainly allow Botswana to benefit from clean water access and 
power generation. Yet, environmental issues are extremely important in Botswana, specifically those 
relating to environmental degradation, water scarcity, the depletion of mineral resources, wildlife 
resources, and the sustainability of economic activities in rural areas (United Nations System in Botswana, 
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2007). Consequently, the Dikgatlhong Dam in Botswana, one of the biggest projects for industrial 
development under Sinohydro has been a concern for the local communities living around the dam’s 
zone. To many locals, Dikgatlhong, has been an environmentally dubious project that will not create 
sustainable development for host communities. “Dikgatlhong Dam contributes to Botswana foremost 
environmental emergency: deforestation caused by free-grazing livestock”, as Bloom and Poplak (2011) 
argue. 
Dam construction by Chinese companies has more often than not been to the detriment of host 
communities and areas. Africa’s dams have done considerable social, environmental and economic 
damage, often with complete disregard for the human rights of dam-affected communities, and have left a 
trail of ‘development-induced poverty’ in their wake (International Rivers-Africa Program, 2010). Large 
hydro dams in Sudan, Senegal, Kenya, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Ghana have brought considerable social, 
environmental and economic damage to their societies and have left a trail of development-induced 
poverty in their wake (Hathaway and Pottinger, 2010). Sadly, these projects have not led to progress in 
electrifying the huge proportion of African populations currently without electricity. China’s engagement 
in Africa is driven by diplomatic, political and economic interests, and contrasts with Western investors 
regarding higher social and environmental standards. And often, the accusations of lack of standards is a 
reflection of inadequate or insufficiently implemented standards in China domestically; Chinese dam 
builders are yet to become more socially and environmentally responsible within China.  
The Three Gorges Dam at Sandouping in Yichang-Hubei province, is one of the most dramatic examples 
with severe consequences for millions of people living around it.  The experience of the Three Gorges 
Dam with regard to environmental and social impacts has been a scary symbol among academics, Non-
Governmental Organizations, policymakers for the expansion of Chinese dam builders overseas. 
According to Mara Hvistendahl (2008), the Three Gorges Dam —the world’s largest — had the potential 
of becoming one of China’s biggest environmental nightmares. Besides being plagued by corruption, high 
costs of construction, environmental, human rights violations and resettlement difficulties, the Three 
Gorges Dam’s project has displaced more than 1.2 million people and flooded 13 cities, 140 towns and 
1350 villages (International Rivers, 2010). People are forced to leave flooded areas for poor lands with 
unsatisfactory conditions and few job opportunities. The massive hydroelectric dam may be triggering 
landslides, altering entire ecosystems and causing other serious environmental problems—and, by 
extension, endangering the millions who live in its shadow. 
Complaints from International NGOs towards Chinese financial and banking institutions arose, much of 
it from Western actors, calling for consideration of environmental and sustainable development issues in 
Chinese operations in Africa. In the 2000s, after China’s accession to the WTO following China’s ‘go out’ 
strategy which motivates Chinese companies to go global, Chinese banks also followed the path to 
expand their activities abroad. Brautigam (2009) states that China EXIMBANK and Everbright Bank had 
already set up representative offices in South Africa in 1999.2 Chinese banks are criticized for not applying 
higher ethical and environmental standards while financing Chinese companies venturing abroad 
(Financial Times: 2 August 2007). The accusation of inadequate environmental and sustainable 
development policies in Chinese financial institutions’ projects overseas do not only cause environmental 
consequences in their specific projects but also raise questions on their environmental standards in 
general. It is only since the 2000s that banking regulations increasingly take environmental standards into 
consideration, both domestically and in international lending operations. 
                                                     
2 Prior to that, Bank of China was already present in Africa in 1997. 
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4. STANDARDS AND NORMS IN POLICIES 
In the early 1980s, multilateral development banks adopted policies regarding the social and 
environmental impacts of their projects, the so-called Equator Principles. Based on determining, assessing 
and managing environmental and social risks in financing projects, the Equator Principles are used to 
fund the development and construction of major infrastructure and industrial projects. The guidelines of 
the Equator Principles should serve as the framework for each adopting institution in its own 
environmental and social policies, procedures and standards related to its project financing.  
The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and several European and US financial institutions 
complained that Chinese banks apply lower environmental and ethical standards in their loans for foreign 
projects. Criticism from Paul Wolfowitz in October 2006 then World Bank president was directed to 
Chinese banks not to apply the Equator Principles while financing projects.3 According to the Financial 
Times, the President of the European Investment Bank Philippe Maystadt criticized Chinese financial 
institutions: “The competition of the Chinese banks is clear. They don’t bother about social or human 
rights conditions” (Financial times: 28 November 2006). Such complaints about Chinese financial 
institutions arguably reflect not only moral indignation and environmental consciousness but also fear 
from Western traditional partners to lose their preferential position and sphere of influence in Africa. 
Lower standards result in lower immediate project costs and give a competitive advantage to Chinese 
banks over their foreign counterparts. The US trade structure, however, is not much less resource based: 
80 per cent of the U.S. imports from sub-Saharan Africa are resource-based (Mol, 2011).  
Concessional loans from China are directed to numerous economic sectors. More than half of all projects 
until 2009 went into public facilities and industrial investments. Some of these projects had immediate 
linkages to environmental concerns, including water conservancy (17 projects), wells and water supply (72 
projects) timber processing (10 projects), and coal extraction (7 projects).  Yet, all projects would have to 
stand the test of how they contribute to sustainable development. Both the diverse actors in provision of 
funding on the Chinese side as well as the rules and regulations on how and for what funding is given will 
have to consider sustainability throughout. 4 
Although Beijing’s priority for economic growth and development is linked to less environmental 
protection both at home and abroad in those cases where Chinese companies are operating, recently 
China’s focus on addressing environmental policies for better sustainable development has become more 
visible in Beijing’s central government’s policies. In November 2011, at the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation meeting in Hawaii, Hu Jintao clearly stated that ‘shifting growth model for better sustainable 
development’. Interestingly, China has strengthened and improved its domestic regulations on both the 
protection of the environment and resettlement planning following internal opposition and criticism 
(Hensengerth, 2010). Through China’s 12th Five-Year Plan, increased emphasis was placed on pollution 
control, energy efficiency and carbon reduction (Li Wanxin, 2011). Although the Chinese government has 
recently published a white paper on environmental policies and emphasizes that it has put in place 
protective environmental and sustainable development regulations, the effects of these regulations are 
limited.5  
                                                     
3 In Les Echos, 24 October 2006 
4 This discussion does not even consider climate change as an important factor which is not sufficiently considered 
by African states, particularly in their high quest for energy. Many African countries often are almost totally 
dependent on hydropower in improving power distribution and yet many areas have experienced droughts. 
Renewable energy for power access should be the main focus for African countries to avoid vulnerability to climate 
change by building hydropower dams (Hathaway and Pottinger, 2010) and would rather seek gains in solar or even 
wind energy. 
5 See Elizabeth Economy, The Great Leap Backward?, in: Foreign Affairs September/October 2007, for a good 
summary of China’s environmental problems and their link to inadequate governance structure 
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The international and African debates and discussions on the environmental consequences of Chinese 
operations overseas are finally starting to have an impact. After a series of (at times violent) protests in 
African countries and the closure of Chinese oil, mining, copper, coal businesses in Africa (Gabon and 
Zambia), the Chinese government is increasingly aware of social and environmental issues that Chinese 
projects create in the continent. The Chinese government, financial institutions and SOEs operating in 
Africa are aware of the threats faced by their investments’ interests due to complaints and discussions 
regarding environmental issues. 
4.1 REGULATING STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 
In China’s willingness to protect its national interests while investing abroad, measures and regulations 
regarding environmental protection became more important with increasing criticism from African 
partners. Their implementation would need to be checked by the Chinese financial institutions which 
support companies for foreign investments. To prevent themselves from being accused of colonial style 
exploitation and taking advantages of weak environmental policies in Africa and to meet Beijing’s focus 
on improving sustainable development and environment policies at home and abroad, they started to 
implement voluntary and self-regulatory measures (Mol, 2011). 
With the aim to improve respect of countries social and environmental policies, Beijing has set guidelines 
for workers’ rights, community relations and environmental impacts in its government-to-government 
projects in Africa (Alden and Alves, 2009; Bosshard, 2008). The Chinese Ministry of Commerce which is 
one of the Chinese offices involved in supporting Chinese overseas investments has the responsibility to 
ensure that Chinese OFDI needs are met and is also concerned about Chinese companies reputation 
abroad. Thus, in August 2006, MOFCOM issued recommendations to urge Chinese companies to 
improve their workers’ safety, respect local policies and adjust to the international environmental and 
safety standards in their overseas investments projects. These reporting standards are specifically 
respected by international enterprises, not least those that are listed at Shanghai or Hong Kong Stock 
exchanged. 
The Chinese government both at the central or provincial level has always been involved in the country’s 
economic development and still has an influence on the large Chinese companies operating in China and 
overseas even though entrepreneurial and industrial reforms have enabled the country to move towards a 
more liberal economy. To mount challenges (late arrival in the world market, lack of high technological, 
entrepreneurial and managerial skills) they face in their expansion process, Chinese State-Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) and big MNCs take into account the government’s role even though Beijing claims 
for more internationally competitive companies as stated in the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015). 
Through the 12th Five-Year Plan China seeks to refine China’s economic development by pushing 
forward the development of emerging strategic industries, expanding independent innovation, and 
pursuing sustainable economic development alongside social harmony and stability (Fung and Peng: 
2012). China aims at greatly enhancing the competency of Chinese enterprises, transforming them from 
followers into leaders on the global stage, and drivers of global growth (12th Five-Year Plan).  
In its objectives to have its MNCs globally competitive, China’s central government is slowly giving its 
companies more autonomy in order to enable them accumulate economic benefits which are the basis of 
their activities. This enables the companies to focus more on their major goals while operating within and 
outside China according to their strategies. Compared to the Western, Japanese and Korean governments, 
however, which have progressively pulled out from the companies’ activities to enable their 
internationalisation and competitiveness in the global market, the Chinese government still has a control 
on the big Chinese enterprises. This somewhat clarifies the mutual influence between political and 
economic factors in China’s “going out” strategy. Chinese multinational companies play a strategic role in 
Beijing’s political economy; particularly in developing countries where they are heavily involved in 
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different sectors. At the same time, the Chinese government relies on the economic interests of its 
companies which operate abroad to promote China’s economic development. With its financial and 
political means, China’s central government influences Chinese companies’ expansion; hence the political 
factors.  The Chinese government’s footprint in Chinese companies’ activities can be seen through the 
linkage between Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Outward Foreign Direct Investment 
(OFDI) where the companies receive finance from the Chinese state financial institutions to build 
infrastructure in developing countries.  
Chinese state agencies, SOEs and private companies developing their activities and operating overseas 
need to be directly aware of Chinese regulation. In January 2008, the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC) with ministerial status issued Corporate Social Responsibility for 
more than 150 Chinese State Owned Enterprises including the three major oil companies SINOPEC (中
国石化), CNOCC (中国石油) and CNPC (中国海洋) operating abroad.6  
The commitment of Chinese State Owned Enterprises to Corporate Social Responsibility has grown in 
recent years. China National Petroleum Corporation for example issued environmental guidelines and 
adopted the ISO 14001 Environmental Management System and began publishing a Corporate Social 
Responsibility Report in 2006. The ISO 14001 standard which is one of a series of emerging international 
environmental management standards aimed at promoting continual improvement in company 
environmental performance through the adoption and implementation of an environmental management 
system. It defines an overall environmental management system and covers the following key elements: 
establishment of an appropriate environmental policy, a planning phase and the implementation and 
operation of the environmental management system (Global Environmental Management Initiative, 
1996). Since 2012, reporting is on sustainability rather than corporate social responsibility, for instance in 
the Huawei Annual Report or the Annual Report of CNPC. Huawei, however, is a private enterprise, 
despite its strong links to the military establishment of China and thus leads us to the discussion on 
regulating private business.  
4.2 GUIDELINES FOR PRIVATE BUSINESS 
Chinese private investment without direct state involvement is substantial and growing in Africa. Over 
the last years, the lack of the Chinese government’s financial support to Chinese private and Small and 
Medium Enterprises (SMEs) to develop their businesses in China to some extent has pushed many 
individual and private entrepreneurs to go abroad for economic opportunities. Therefore Chinese small 
scale and private investments overseas are increasing drastically. Estimates go as high as over 80 per cent 
of projects in Africa from Jiangsu and Shandong province and more than 90 per cent of projects in Africa 
from Zhejiang province are privately owned (Shen, 2013). 
For all investments abroad, thus including by private companies, Guidelines for Environmental Protection in 
Foreign Investment and Cooperation were published by China’s Ministry of Environmental Protection and the 
Ministry of Commerce in April 2013. These guidelines are relatively close to the OECD standards. For 
instance, they call onto investors to “respect the cultural heritage of the local communities” (Art. 3) and 
they encourage to regularly release environmental information (Art. 18). Further, planning for waste 
management and contingency planning for emergency situation is called for, as well as environmental 
surveys of the local area of an investment. These voluntary guidelines do, however, not make reference to 
community or individual rights and do not state whether projects can go ahead if they do not live up to 
the defined standards (cf. Mang, 2013). 
                                                     
6 In 2008 major multinational Sinosteel became the first Chinese enterprise to release a sustainability report on its 
African operation (http: //en.sinosteel.com/Culture/Sustainability/index_1.shtml) 
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China’s government introduced a Green Credit Policy in 2007, aiming at applying the standards also in 
their overseas’ operations. These guidelines led to a green credit loan portfolio of overall US$ 200 billion 
by 2011, combining China Development Bank and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), 
for projects in waste treatment, renewable energy, and pollution control. China’s Banking Regulatory 
Committee (CBRC) has announced that it would setup performance indicators for this lending facility; it 
is also working on sector specific guidelines with the Ministry of Environmental Protection. While the 
existing guidelines are voluntary, CBRC is requesting reporting on them (IFC, 2013). 
5. REGULATIONS THROUGH FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
Chinese financial flows to Africa have increased steeply, particularly over the last decade, through 
investments and cooperation projects. These increasing financial flows from China to Africa – in the 
form of investments and publicly subsidised project funding – present an opportunity for the continent, if 
managed cautiously and strategically. One element to consider is the sustainability of investments, which 
includes looking at environmental sustainability in development projects. Regulations are both at the 
levels of direction of projects and in the lending policies of institutions. Secondly, process can be 
prescribed through policies, such as environmental impact assessments.  
5.1 SUSTAINABILITY AND LENDING POLICIES 
Specific policies regarding environmental issues in Chinese expansion overseas have been developed 
through financial institutions (China Export and Import Bank, China Africa Development Fund, China 
Development Bank) supporting Chinese companies to venture abroad. Chinese development finance 
includes grants, loans (of varying degree of concessionality) and investments. By the end of 2009, China 
had provided a total of RMB 256.29 billion (USD 37.39 billion in 2009) in aid to foreign countries, of 
which 45.7 per cent was to African states, as China’s Aid Policy states. Since, new and substantial 
commitments have been made. At the 5th meeting of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) 
in July 2012, Chinese President Hu Jintao announced an additional USD 20 billion in development 
finance for Africa between 2013 and 2015. And business relations are further broadening: During the 
Conference of Chinese and African entrepreneurs held in Beijing at the fringes of FOCAC V, 20 projects 
between Chinese and African companies were signed with a reported total investment of US$ 341 million. 
During the same conference the China-Africa Development Fund (CADFund), a Chinese government 
equity fund to support investments in Africa, committed to investing US$ 2 billion in 60 Sino-African 
projects across 30 African countries which include an economic and trade zone in Egypt, a cement 
factory in Ethiopia and a power plant in Ghana (Grimm and Schickerling, 2013). International NGOs, 
such as the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) office in China, in collaboration with local organizations 
including the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Environmental Protection and the National 
Development and Reform Commission try to improve the environmental responsibility and sustainability 
of Chinese foreign economic activities (Schorn, 2009).  
Key actor in Chinese development finance is the Ministry of Commerce, working with state-owned 
lending institutions such as China EXIM bank and other national ministry departments. The China 
Development Bank, despite its name, is a commercial bank, but hosts the China-Africa Development 
Fund, as an equity fund. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is consulted for funding decisions, but overall it 
has a rather weak role. Obviously, the Ministry of Finance is also important in providing funding lines. 
Chinese funding usually comes in a package deal, comprising grant projects, concessional loans for 
infrastructure projects, and trade arrangements, such as access to resources as barter for credit lines. 
These packages are agreed during meetings of a bi-national commission or at the occasion of high-level 
visits.  
Contact points in partner countries are the Economic and Commercial Counsellors who are staff of the 
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and are based at the Chinese Embassy (albeit not always in the same 
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building). Short-term expert missions explore the feasibility of projects. Special financial institutions such 
as EXIM Bank or the China Development Bank (CBD) provide concessional loans or export buyer 
credits, while grants are directly provided by the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(for humanitarian assistance) or the Ministry of Finance (for multilateral engagement).  
Foreign investment rules and the process of foreign assistance have repeatedly undergone changes, trying 
to adjust to market principles, but increasingly also taking on board environmental concerns. Besides 
economic viability, environmental impact has become one criterion to assess projects that are presented 
for funding. Given the relatively recent embrace of environmental policy at national level, the concept of 
sustainability does not feature prominently in mandates operating abroad. EXIM Bank, for instance, 
which aims as “to facilitate the export and import […], assist Chinese companies with comparative 
advantages in their offshore contract projects and outbound investment, and promote Sino-foreign 
relationship and international economic and trade cooperation,” has clear guidelines for project 
procurement (e.g. “no less than 50 per cent of total procurement shall be made in China”). 
Environmental aspects, however, do not feature in the process description on government concessional 
loans on EXIM’s website.  
As regards assistance projects, the procedure is as follows: (1) Projects are agreed upon by the partner 
government and the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), often via communication with the 
Economic Councillors at the Chinese embassy; (2) MOFCOM has the project assessed by an expert 
group in the field; (3) various Chinese government departments are consulted on the project; (4) China 
State Council can take the ultimate decision; (5) after agreement, funds are made available by the Ministry 
of Commerce to the respective implementing line ministry or via a bidding process for project 
implementation; (6) projects are contracted to enterprises or are executed by specialised entities such as 
research institutions. These stages are only applicable for official projects funded by the Chinese 
government; private investments follow an individual path and sometimes also operate through 
subsidiaries in African countries (registered there, not in China). 
China has no specialised aid implementation agency; implementation rests with teams sent by provincial 
or municipal entities, e.g. for agricultural demonstration centres or vocational schools, or with enterprises 
that win tenders for specific projects. Overall responsibilities are with a unit in MOFCOM. It has to be 
noted that none of the financial institutions’ activities are dedicated solely to Africa, with the notable 
exception of the China-Africa Development Fund (CADFund). However, activities in Africa have gained 
more importance. According to the African Development Bank (AfDB), funding to Africa accounts for a 
third of China EXIM bank’s total global assets. China Export and Import Bank is the main financier for 
Chinese companies investing abroad; in 2004, it developed its own environmental policy and impact 
assessments. Through such policy, the Chinese State financial credit agency urged Chinese companies 
venturing overseas to comply with host country’s policies regarding sustainable development and 
environmental protection. 
5.2 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENTS 
In Africa, environmental and social impacts of Chinese investments have received the attention of 
African Non-Governmental Organizations, policymakers and academics. In September 2006, in an effort 
to make governments pay more attention to the environmental impacts of China’s presence in Africa and 
establish strong environmental regulations, the African Union urged all actors to ensure that China is 
concerned with the protection of the environment in its investments practices in Africa.7 International 
Rivers and World Wildlife Fund offices in the continent work closely with Chinese companies present in 
many countries, especially in critical areas such as dam construction and resource extraction sectors such 
                                                     
7 African Union meeting of the task force on Africa’s Strategic Partnership with Emerging Powers: China, India and 
Brazil, September 2006, pp5 
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as mining and forestry to adjust environmental policies and make China-Africa economic relations more 
sustainable.  
In 2007, China Exim Bank issued guidelines for social and environmental impacts assessments for its loan 
projects. Such guidelines were to improve the 2004 environmental policy. The guidelines were developed 
in accordance with the China's Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Law, Environmental Protection 
Law, and Environmental Management for Construction Project Ordinance, and with reference to 
regulations and procedures for environmental and social assessments of other international financial 
organizations (China Exim Bank Environmental Protection policy, 2007). China Exim Bank through its 
environmental protection policy (at least on paper) pays a high level of attention to its funded projects’ 
environmental impacts. The environmental policy enhances environmental monitoring and management 
before, during and after project implementation.8  
Before the project, China Exim Bank makes environmental impact assessment, one of the basic 
requirements and elements during the project review. Funded projects are required to conduct 
environmental impact studies and obtain endorsement or approval from the recipient country’s 
environmental administration. Projects harmful to the environment and which do not have approval from 
the environmental administration will not be funded (China Exim Bank Environmental Protection policy, 
2007). During the project examination, China Exim Bank examines the project’s implementation which 
takes into account environmental impacts. During the implementation of the project, if any unacceptable 
negative environmental impacts result, China Exim Bank will require the implementation unit to take 
immediate remedial or preventive measures and will discontinue financial support (China Exim Bank 
Environmental Protection policy, 2007). 
After the project, China Exim Bank will make a post-project review in project implementation and 
completion status, and its impacts. The post-project review allows China Exim Bank to revise the 
measures taken before and during implementation for similar projects. If necessary, the related 
requirements and policies will be fully revised (China Exim Bank Environmental Protection policy, 2007). 
Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) take a varying degree of thoroughness and 
comprehensiveness. In some instances, timelines might be rather driven to get fast approval to a project 
rather than thoroughness of the analysis. While speed might be good for ‘doing business’ scores, one can 
doubt the quality of an assessment if done in a too short time. If impact assessments are taken as the 
linchpin instead of international good practice, effects might be a race to the bottom. Furthermore, EIAs 
come with own limitations, for instance with regard to trans-boundary effects and long-term assessments.  
6. CONCLUSION 
The practical reconciliation of environmental protection and conservation with economic and social 
development remains a challenge for developing and developed countries alike. It is an interesting – and 
extremely relevant – question whether environmental awareness and key concepts of sustainability can 
only strive in more developed societies, i.e. in societies in which basic needs are being taken care of. The 
conflict points with investments in Africa (here: by China) clearly indicate that environmental thinking is 
not an issue for wealthy societies only. Environmental awareness in the public and in policy making 
might, however, be following a V-shaped curve in the development process. Thus far, development is 
fundamentally understood as being about human control over the environment. The very concept of 
development is that humankind is shaping the environment, making people less subject to natural hazard. 
In this rationale, it is logical that in many societies, a “natural state” is perceived as the situation to be 
overcome. While non-industrialised, agrarian societies base their livelihood on a life dependent on natural 
cycles and thus sensitive to environmental factors (which are sought be somewhat managed, 
                                                     
8 中国进出口关于中国的环境保护政策/About China’s Environmental Protection Policy (English translation). 
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nevertheless), early industrialisation seems to come with a “can do” attitude that rather sees 
environmental issues as yet another managerial challenge, thus posing problems with policies and 
perceptions (Hong Jiang, 2010). In the debate on Chinese investments in Africa, much of the perceptions 
and differences in development levels come to play.  
In China’s engagement in Africa, the close ties between the Chinese, African states and companies drive 
the largest part of Chinese investments in the continent. Enjoying political and financial support from 
state institutions relevant to their activities in African countries, Chinese MNCs and SOEs expand their 
businesses in various sectors of Africa’s economy.  The Chinese government through its state institutions 
build strong political and diplomatic relationship with African governments to secure investments and 
markets.  Even though China’s central government is increasingly loosening its hold on its companies’ 
activities to enable them to become more competitive in the global market, measures of control still exist. 
Backed by Chinese state banks, Chinese multinational companies have a comparative advantage 
compared to their foreign competitors to invest overseas mainly since the ongoing 2008 financial crisis 
which has made it more difficult for the Triad MNEs to remain the dominant traditional investors in 
Africa. 
The changes related to the arrival of Chinese companies (and other NTMNEs) in Africa come along with 
challenges to regulate the business environment in many African countries; particularly those endowed 
with resources in which China is increasingly interested for its own resources-security.  Issues related to 
transparency, corruption, poor governance, human rights, environment and sustainable development 
need to be tackled; mainly in the authoritarian or pariah regimes where opaque deals are sealed between 
officials and Chinese investors.  With the political elite making private use of the available resources in 
several African countries through non transparent delivery of exploitations’ licenses, allocation of mining 
projects or oil concessions to only benefit their families and probably their political parties, the long-run 
implications of China’s drive in Africa’s extractive industries are uncertain. 
Even though the lack of adequate infrastructure in various sectors drives African governments to seek 
more foreign investments not only from the traditional but also emerging investors, the resources versus 
infrastructure development model should be carefully addressed. Resources management by African 
countries to yield considerable revenues out of the resources’ exploitation and production should be 
beneficial to the majority of impoverished Africans, contribute to skill and technology transfer and aim at 
developing high-added value industries.  In addition, they should not sell below the world commodities’ 
market prices either. It is critical to have strong governments with thoroughly elaborated policies and 
regulations by competent people in charge of the extractive industries’ management in African countries 
to control local and foreign investments. 
China’s investment in Africa should be based on a strategic plan for development that considers 
communities’ needs. High pressure due to demands for delivery on social and economic development has 
so far left limited space for environmental concerns both in China and in Africa – and in their growing 
relation This, together with a general lack of public information, threatens to taint China’s image in 
Africa, as long-term ecological costs are likely to be associated with Chinese investments. There are clear 
roles to play to change this situation at all levels of decision-making and involvement of civil society, 
together with wider engagement with the public, has many benefits for the enterprises, for China’s 
government and certainly for the African societies. 
Increasingly, Chinese investments in Africa are expanding from resources and infrastructure building to 
services and involve new actors (private small and medium-sized companies) whose investments 
according to a recent World Bank report account for 55 per cent of Chinese FDI in African countries. It 
becomes relevant to keep an eye on these new developments which will become difficult for host 
countries’ economies. China’s expansion into Africa’s services sector; particularly into the financial sector 
to secure financial assets and provide funds for already existing investments by Chinese companies or 
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create new investments projects should be carefully questioned by African governments. This 
diversification of investments holds new opportunities for aspects of sustainability norms, as the 
dominance of (environmentally hazardous) resource extraction is somewhat reduced, which might reflect 
in a more nuanced approach by the Chinese government.  
In Africa, collaboration between governments–over their political and economic interests–and Non-
Governmental Organizations should work together to better plan particularly in extractive industries and 
dam building projects to adjust environmental and sustainable development concerns. To save rural areas 
where most of Chinese investments in extractive industries and environmentally sensitive zones take 
place, African governments will have to strengthen governance and public accountability (Hathaway, 
2010). Governments and civil society together should put in place guidelines and work towards their 
implementation through different actors involved in sensitive investing sectors, not least so as many 
effects are trans-boundary. Transparency and public participation from civil society, Non-Governmental 
Organizations, governments and companies could contribute to working towards sustainable 
development. Populations’ lives, environmental and economic will have to be taken into account for a 
better sustainable economic development; Chinese political actors seem to be increasingly aware of the 
challenge both domestically but also in their international engagements. The instruments for 
implementation of policies, however, will have to be improved and will need to continuously adapted.  
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